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Abstract. This paper defines a general class of cooperative games for
which the nucleolus is efficiently computable. This class includes new
members for which the complexity of computing their nucleolus was
not previously known. We show that when the minimum excess coali-
tion problem of a cooperative game can be formulated as a hypergraph
dynamic program its nucleolus is efficiently computable. This gives a
general technique for designing efficient algorithms for computing the
nucleolus of a cooperative game. This technique is inspired by a recent
result of Pashkovich [23] on weighted voting games. However our tech-
nique significantly extends beyond the capabilities of previous work. We
demonstrate this by applying it to give an algorithm for computing the
nucleolus of b-matching games in polynomial time on graphs of bounded
treewidth.
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1 Introduction and Related Work
Cooperative game theory studies situations in which individual agents form
coalitions to work together towards a common goal. It studies questions re-
garding what sort of coalitions will form and how they will share the surplus
generated by their collective efforts. A cooperative game is defined by an ordered
pair ([n], ν) where [n] is a finite set of players (labelled 1, . . . , n), and ν is a
function from subsets of [n] to R indicating the value earned by each particular
coalition.
This paper studies the computational complexity of one of the most classical,
deep, and widely applicable solution concepts for surplus division in cooperative
games, the nucleolus. In particular we study the relationship between the nu-
cleolus, finding the minimum excess of a coalition, congruency-constrained op-
timization, and dynamic programming. Our first result unifies these areas and
provides a general method for computing the nucleolus.
Theorem 1. For any cooperative game (n, ν), if the minimum excess coalition
problem on (n, ν) can be solved in time T via an integral dynamic program then
the nucleolus of (n, ν) can be computed in time polynomial in T .
Pashkovich [23] showed how to reduce the problem of computing the nucleolus
for weighted voting games to a congruency-constrained optimization problem.
Pashkovich then shows how to solve this congruency-constrained optimization
problem for this specific class of games via a dynamic program. In Section 3
we abstract his reduction to the setting of computing the nucleolus of general
combinatorial optimization games.
Our main technical achievement is showing that adding congruency con-
straints to dynamic programs modelled by a directed acyclic hypergraph model
inspired by the work of Campbell, Martin, and Rardin [7] adds only a polyno-
mial factor to the computational complexity. This is the content of Theorem 3,
which is instrumental in demonstrating Theorem 1. Our formal model of dynamic
programming, where solutions correspond to directed hyperpaths in a directed
acyclic hypergraph, is described in Section 4. Proving Theorem 3 requires signif-
icant new techniques beyond [23]. The series of lemmas in Section 4.1 take the
reader through these techniques for manipulating directed acyclic hypergraph
dynamic programs.
We show how Theorem 1 not only generalizes previous work on computing
the nucleolus, but significantly extends our capabilities to new classes of combi-
natorial optimization games that were not possible with just the ideas in [23]. As
we explain in Section 1.3, matching games are central to the study of combina-
torial optimization games. The problem of computing the nucleolus of weighted
matching games was a long-standing open problem [12] [16] resolved only re-
cently [19], nearly twenty years after it was first posed. The frontier for the field
has now moved to b-matching games, for which computing the nucleolus is be-
lieved to be NP-hard in general due to the result in [5] which shows computing
leastcore allocations to be NP-hard even in the unweighted, bipartite case with
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b ≡ 3. In Section 5 we give a result which significantly narrows the gap between
what is known to be tractable and what is known to be intractable in that area.
Theorem 2. For any cooperative b-matching game on a graph whose treewidth
is bounded by a constant, the nucleolus can be computed in polynomial time.
To achieve this result we give a dynamic program for computing the minimum
excess coalition of a b-matching game in Lemma 12 then apply Theorem 1.
This dynamic program necessarily requires the use of dynamic programming on
hypergraphs instead of just simple graphs, motivating the increased complexity
of our model over previous work.
1.1 The Nucleolus
When studying the question of surplus division, it is commonly desireable that
shares will be split so all players have an incentive to work together, i.e. that the
grand coalition forms. A vector x ∈ Rn is called an allocation, and if that vector
satisfies x([n]) = ν([n]) (efficiency) and xi ≥ ν({i}), for all i ∈ [n], (individual
rationality) we call x an imputation. We denote the set of imputations of (n, ν)
by I(n, ν).
For any S ⊆ [n] we define x(S) − ν(S) to be the excess of S with respect to
allocation x. The following linear program maximizes the minimum excess:
max ǫ (P1)
s.t. x(S) ≥ ν(S) + ǫ ∀S ⊆ [n]
x ∈ I(n, ν)
We call this the leastcore linear program. For any ǫ be let P1(ǫ) denote the set of
allocations x such that (x, ǫ) is a feasible solution to (P1). If we let ǫ1 denote the
optimal value of (P1) then we call P1(ǫ1) the leastcore of the cooperative game.
For an imputation x ∈ I(n, ν) let θ(x) ∈ R2
n−2 be the vector obtained by
sorting the list of excess values x(S) − ν(S), for each ∅ 6= S ⊂ [n], in non-
decreasing order.
Definition 1. The nucleolus is the imputation which lexicographically maxi-
mizes θ(x), formally: the nucleolus is equal to arg lexmax{θ(x) : x ∈ I(n, ν)}.
The nucleolus was first defined by Schmeidler [27]. In the same paper, Schmeidler
showed the nucleolus to be a unique allocation and a continuous function of
ν. The nucleolus is a classical object in game theory, attracting attention for
its geometric beauty [21], and its surprising applications. The most ancient of
which is the application of the nucleolus as a bankrupcy division scheme in
the Babylonian Talmud [2]. Some other notable applications of the nucleolus
include but are not limited to water supply management [1], fair file sharing on
peer-to-peer networks [22], resource sharing in job assignment [28], and airport
pricing [6].
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1.2 Computing the Nucleolus
Multiple approaches exist for algorithmically finding the nucleolus of a coop-
erative game. The most ubiquitous of which is Maschler’s Scheme [21] which
operates by solving a hierarchy of at most n linear programs, the last of which
has the nucleolus as its unique optimal solution. In Section 2 we elaborate on
Maschler’s Scheme and a natural relaxation thereof.
The complexity of computing the nucleolus varies dramatically depending
on how the cooperative game (n, ν) is presented as input. If the function ν is
presented explicitly, by giving as input the value of ν(S) for each S ⊆ [n], then
Maschler’s Scheme can be used to compute the nucleolus in polynomial time.
The issue in this case is that the size of the specification of ν is exponential in the
number of players and so the computation is trivial. We are interested coopera-
tive games where ν can be determined implicitly via some auxiliary information
given as input, which we call a compact representation of (n, ν).
One prominent example of a cooperative game with a compact representation
is the class of weighted voting games. In a weighted voting game, each player
i ∈ [n] is associated with an integer weight wi ∈ Z. Additionally a threshold
value T ∈ Z is given. For each S ⊆ [n] the value of ν(S ∈ {0, 1} is 1 if and only
if w(S) ≥ T .
It is not hard to see that (n, ν) is completely determined by (w, T ). In this
case (w, T ) is a compact representation of the weighted voting game (n, ν). Even
though they may appear simple at first, weighted voting games can have a lot of
modelling power. In fact the voting system of the European Union can be mod-
elled by a combination of weighted voting games [3]. In [11] Elkind, Goldberg,
Goldberg, and Wooldridge show that the problem of computing the nucleolus of
a weighted voting game is NP-hard, in fact even the problem of testing if a point
is in the leastcore of a weighted voting game is NP-complete. Pashkovich [23]
later followed up with an algorithm based on Maschler’s Scheme which solves
O(n) linear programs, each in pseudopolynomial time, and thus computes the
nucleolus of a weighted voting game in pseudopolynomial time.
Pashkovich’s result crucially relies on the existence of a well-structured dy-
namic program for knapsack cover problems which runs in pseudopolynomial
time. Theorem 1 and Section 5 place Pahskovich’s algorithm in the context of
a general framework for computing the nucleolus of cooperative games where a
natural associated problem has a dynamic program: the minimum excess coali-
tion problem.
Definition 2. In the minimum excess coalition problem the given input is a
compact representation of a cooperative game (n, ν) and an imputation x. The
goal is to output a coalition S ⊆ [n] which minimizes excess, i.e. x(S) − ν(S),
with respect to x.
1.3 Combinatorial Optimization Games
A very general class of cooperative games with compact representations comes
from the so-called cooperative combinatorial optimization games. In games of
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this class some overarching combinatorial structure is fixed on the players, and
for each subset S of players, ν(S) can be determined by solving an optimization
problem on this structure. Many classes of combinatorial optimization games
can be defined and the complexity of their nucleoli have been studied leading to
polynomial time algorithms in some cases, such as fractional matching, cover,
and clique games [8], simple flow games [25], assignment games[29] and matching
games [16]. Other cases have led to NP-hardness proofs, such as flow games [9]
and spanning tree games [13].
A prominent example of combinatorial optimization games is matching games.
In matching games the players are vertices of a graph G and ν(S) is equal to
the size of the largest matching on G[S]. The question of whether or not the
nucleolus of weighted matching games could always be computed in polynomial
time was open for a long time [12] [16]. Solymosi and Raghavan [29] gave an algo-
rithm for computing the nucleolus of matching games on bipartite graphs. Biro´,
Kern and Paulusma gave a combinatorial algorithm for computing the nucleolus
of weighted matching games with a non-empty core [4]. Recently Koenemann,
Pashkovich, and Toth [19] resolved the question by giving a compact formulation
for each linear program in Maschler’s Scheme for weighted matching games with
empty core.
A natural generalization of matching games is to weighted b-matching games.
In weighted b-matching games a vector b ∈ ZV (G) and vector w ∈ RE(G) are given
in addition to the graph G. The value of S ⊆ [n] is equal to the maximum w-
weight subset of edges in G[S] such that each playere v ∈ V (G) is incident to
at most bv edges. In [5] they show how to test if an allocation is in the core of
b-matching games when b ≤ 2, and they show that for matching games where
b ≡ 3 deciding if an allocation is in the core is coNP-complete. This result likely
means that computing the nucleolus of b ≡ 3-matching games is NP-hard. In [19]
they show how to separate over the leastcore of any b ≤ 2-matching game. The
question of computing the nucleolus of b-matching games remains open. By the
preceding complexity discussion, it is highly likely that it is necessary to impose
some structure on b-matching games to compute their nucleolus in polynomial
time. In Theorem 2 we impose the structure of bounded treewidth and use
our general framework we give an algorithm which computes the nucleolus of
weighted b-matching games on graphs which have this structure.
2 Maschler’s Scheme
The most prominent technique for computing the nucleolus is Maschler’s
Scheme [21]. To define Maschler’s Scheme we need the notion of a fixed set for
a polyhedron. For any polyhedron Q, we define the set Fix(Q) as
Fix(Q) := {S ⊆ [n] : ∃c ∈ R such that ∀x ∈ Q, x(S) = c}.
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In Maschler’s Scheme a sequence of linear programs (P1), (P2), . . . , (PN ) is com-
puted where the ith linear program (i ≥ 2) is of the form
max ǫ (Pi)
s.t. x(S) ≥ ν(S) + ǫ ∀S 6∈ Fix(Pi−1(ǫi−1))
x ∈ Pi−1(ǫi−1),
and the first linear program is the leastcore linear program (P1). The method
terminates when the optimal solution is unique (yielding the nucleolus), and this
happens after at most n rounds [24], since the dimension of the set of character-
istc vectors of sets in Fix(Pi(ǫi)) increases by at least one in each iteration.
Since Maschler’s Scheme ends after at most n linear program solves, the run
time of the method is dominated by the time it takes to solve (Pi). To use the
Ellipsoid Method [17,20] to implement Maschler’s Scheme we need be able to
separate over the constraints corresponding to all coalitions in Fix(Pi−1(ǫi−1))
in each iteration. There can be an exponential number of such constraints in
general, and some structure on the underlying cooperative game would need to
be observed in order to separate these constraints efficiently. This requirement
can be relaxed somewhat, and still retain the linear number of iterations required
to compute the nucleolus.
2.1 The Relaxed Maschler’s Scheme
We will define a sequence of linear programs Q1, Q2, . . . , QN where the unique
optimal solution to QN is the nucleolus of (n, ν). With each linear program Qi
there will be an associated set of vectors Vi contained in the set of incidence
vectors of Fix(Qi). The feasible solutions to Qi will lie in R
n × R. In keeping
with the notion we used for Pi(ǫi), for each linear program Qi we let ǫ¯i be the
optimal value of Qi and let
Qi(ǫ¯i) := {x ∈ R
n : (x, ǫ¯i) is feasible for Qi}.
We will describe the linear programs {Qi}i inductively. The first linear pro-
gram is again the leastcore linear program of (n, ν). That is to say Q1 is equal to
(P1). Let V1 ⊆ Rn be a singleton containing the incidence vector of one coalition
in Fix(Q1(ǫ¯1)). Now given Qi−1 and Vi−1 we describe Qi as follows
max ǫ (Qi)
s.t. x(S) ≥ ν(S) + ǫ ∀S : χ(S) 6∈ span(Vi−1)
x ∈ Qi−1(ǫ¯i−1).
Now we choose v ∈ Fix(Qi(ǫi))\ span(Vi−1) and set Vi := Vi−1 ∪ {v}. By the
optimality of ǫi, v always exists as long as Qi(ǫi) has affine dimension at least 1.
If Qi(ǫi) has affine dimension 0 we terminate the procedure and conclude that
Qi(ǫ¯i
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A nice proof of correctness for this scheme is given in [23], where this scheme
is used to give a pseudopolynomial time algorithm for computing the nucleolus
of weighted voting games.
Lemma 1. When the Relaxed Maschler Scheme is run on a cooperative game
(n, ν) yielding a hierarchy of linear programs Q1, . . . , QN , with optimal values
ǫ¯1, . . . , ǫ¯N respectively, the set QN (ǫ¯N ) is a singleton containing the nucleolus of
(n, ν). Moreover N is at most n.
3 The Linear Subspace Avoidance Problem
Motivated by the desire to design a separation oracle for the constraints of
(Qi) we initiate a general study of combinatorial optimization problems whose
feasible region avoids a linear subspace. For our purposes, we say a combinatorial
optimization problem is an optimization problem of the form
max{f(x) : x ∈ X} (P )
where X ⊆ {0, 1}n is known as the feasible region, and f : X → R is the
objective function. Normally (P ) is presented via a compact representation. For
example in the shortest path problem on a directed graph, X is the family of
paths in a directed graph D and f(x) is a linear function. The entire feasible
set X is uniquely determined by the underlying directed graph D, and f is
determined by weights on the arcs of D. When giving as input D and the arc
weights, the problem is completely determined without specifying every one of
the exponentially many paths in X .
For compactly represented cooperative games the minimum excess coalition
problem can be phrased as a problem of the form (P ). Simply take X to be the
set of incidence vectors of subsets of [n] and take f(x) to be x(S)− ν(S).
Now consider a linear subspace L ⊆ RE . For our combinatorial optimization
problem (P ), the associated linear subspace avoidance problem is
max{f(x) : x ∈ X\L} (PL)
Even when (P ) can be solved in polynomial time with respect to its compact
representation and L is given through a basis, (PL) can be NP-hard. For proof
see Appendix A.1
Lemma 2. (PL) is NP-hard in general even when (P ) can be solved in polyno-
mial time with respect to its compact representation and L is given through a
basis.
Observe that when we formulate the minimum excess coalition problem for a
cooperative game (n, ν) as a problem of the form (P ) and we take L = span(Vi−1)
then (PL) is the ellipsoid method separation problem for (Qi), the i-th linear
program in the relaxed Maschler Scheme. This discussion yields the following
easy lemma
Lemma 3. If (P ) is a minimum excess coalition problem of a cooperative game
(n, ν) and one can solve the associated (PL) for any L in polynomial time then
the nucleolus of (n, ν) can be computed in polynomial time.
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3.1 Reducing Linear Subspace Avoidance to Congruency-
Constrainted Optimization
The goal of this subsection is to show the connection between solving (PL) and
solving congruency-constrained optimization. This connection was first drawn in
the work of Pashkovich [23] for the special case of weighted voting games. Here
we abstract their work to apply it to our more general framework.
By the following lemma, we can restrict our attention from linear indepen-
dence over R to linear independence over finite fields. We present a proof in
Appendix A.2 for completeness.
Lemma 4. (Pashkovich [23]) Let P be a set of prime numbers such that |P | ≥
log2(n!) with n ≥ 3. A set of vectors v1, . . . , vk ∈ {0, 1}
n are linearly indepen-
dent over R if and only if there exists p ∈ P such that v1, . . . , vk are linearly
independent over Fp.
Moreover, the set P can be found in O(n3) time, and each p in P can be
encoded in O(log(n)) bits.
This lemma enables us to reduce the problem (PL) to the problem of com-
puting (P ) subject to a congruency constraint:
max{f(x) : x ∈ X , vTx = k mod p} (PL,p,v,k)
Lemma 5. If one can solve (PL,p,v,k) in time T the one can solve (PL) in time
O(n6T ).
See Appendix A.3 for proof.
4 Dynamic Programming
Our goal is to define a class of problems where tractability of (P ) can be lifted
to tractability of (PL,p,v,k) and hence via Lemma 5 to (PL). Our candidate will
be problems which have a dynamic programming formulation. The model of
dynamic programming we propose is based on the model of Martin, Rardin, and
Campbell [7].
The essence of a dynamic programming solution to a problem is a decomposi-
tion of a solution to the program into optimal solutions to smaller subproblems.
We will use a particular type of hypergraph to describe the structure of depen-
dencies of a problem on its subproblems.
To begin we will need to introduce some concepts. A directed hypergraph
H = (V,E) is an ordered pair, where V is a finite set referred to as the vertices
or nodes of the hypergraph, and E is a finite set where each element is of the
form (v, S) where S ⊆ V and v ∈ V \S. We refer to the elements of E as edges
or arcs of H . For an arc e = (v, S) ∈ E we call v the tail of e and say e is
outgoing from v. We call S the heads of e, call each u ∈ S a head of e, and say e
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is incoming on each u ∈ S. We call vertices with no incoming arcs sources and
we call vertices with no outgoing arcs sinks.
For any non-empty strict subset of vertices U ⊂ V , we define the cut induced
by U , denoted δ(U), as follows
δ(U) := {(v, S) ∈ E : v ∈ U and S ∩ (V \U) 6= ∅}.
We say a directed hypergraph is connected if it has no empty cuts.
A directed hyperpath is a directed hypergraph P satisfying the following:
– there is a unique vertex s ∈ V (P ) identified as the start of P ,
– the start s is the tail of at most one arc of P , and the head of no arcs of H ,
– every vertex in V (P )\{s} is the tail of precisely one arc of H ,
– P is connected.
Observe that there is at least one, and potentially many, vertices of a path which
have one incoming arc and no outgoing arcs. These vertices we call the ends of
the path. If there is a path starting from a vertex u and ending with a vertex
v then we say u is an ancestor to v and v is a descendant of u. For any vertex
v ∈ V (H), the subgraph of H rooted at v, denoted Hv, is the subgraph of H
induced by the descendants of v (including v).
We say that a directed hypergraph H = (V,E) is acyclic if there exists a
topological ordering of the vertices of H . That is to say, there exists a bijection
t : V → [|V |] such that for every (v, S) ∈ E, for each u ∈ S, t(v) < t(u).
A common approach to dynamic programming involves a table of subprob-
lems (containing information pertaining to their optimal solutions), and a recur-
sive function describing how to compute an entry in the table based on the values
of table entries which correspond to smaller subproblems. The values in the table
are then determined in a bottom-up fashion. In our formal model, the entries
in the table correspond to vertices of the hypergraph, and each hyperarc (v, S)
describes a potential way of computing a feasible solution to the subproblem at
v by composing the solutions to the subproblems at each node of S.
Consider a problem of the form (P ). That is, we have a feasible region X ⊆ Rn
and an objective function f : X → R and we hope to maximize f(x) subject
to x ∈ X . We need some language to describe how solutions to the dynamic
program, i.e. paths in the directed hypergraph, will map back to solutions in the
original problem space. To do this mapping back to the original space we will use
an affine function. A function g : Rm → Rn is said to be affine if there exists a
matrix A ∈ Rn×m and a vector b ∈ Rn such that for any x ∈ Rm, g(x) = Ax+ b.
Oftentimes an affine function g will have a domain RE indexed by a finite
set E. When this happens for any S ⊆ E we use g(S) as a shorthand for g(χ(S))
where χ(S) is the incidence vector of S. We further shorten g({e}) to g(e).
Definition 3. Let H = (V,E) be a directed acyclic connected hypergraph with
set of sources T . Let P(H) denote the set of paths in H which begin at a source
in T and end only at sinks of H. Let g : RE → Rn be an affine map which we will
use to map between paths in P(H) and feasible solutions in X . Let c : RE → R
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be an affine function we will use as an objective function. We say (H, g, c) is a
dynamic programming formulation for (P ) if g(P(H)) = X , and moreover for
any x ∈ X ,
f(x) = max
P∈g−1(x)
c(P ).
In other words, the optimal values of
max{c(P ) : P ∈ P(H)} (DP)
and (P ) are equal, and the feasible region of (P ) is the image (under g) of the
feasible region of (DP). The size of a dynamic programming formulation is the
number of arcs in E(H).
In [7] the authors show that (DP) has a totally dual integral extended formu-
lation of polynomial size. Thus they show that (DP) can be solved in polynomial
time via linear programming. They further show that the extreme point optimal
solution of this extended formulation lie in {0, 1}E under the following reference
subsets condition: there exists a ground set I, and nonempty subsets Iv ⊆ I for
each vertex v ∈ V (H) satisfying
1. Ij ⊆ Iℓ for all (ℓ, J) ∈ H such that j ∈ J
2. and Ij ∩ Ij′ = ∅ for all (ℓ, J) ∈ E(H) such that j, j′ ∈ J with j 6= j′.
This condition is equivalent to the following no common descendants condi-
tion: for each (ℓ, J) ∈ E(H) for all u 6= v ∈ J , there does not exist w ∈ V (H)
such that w is a descendant of both u and v. For proof see Appendix A.4.
Lemma 6. For any directed acyclic hypergraph H = (V,E) the reference subsets
condition is equivalent to the “no common descendants” condition defined above.
We say that a dynamic programming formulation (H, g, c) of a problem (P ) is
integral if H satisfies the no common descendants condition. By the preceding
discussion we have the following lemma
Lemma 7. If a problem (P ) has an integral dynamic programming formulation
(H, g, c) then (P ) can be solved in time polynomial in the encoding of (H, g, c).
4.1 Congruency Constrained Dynamic Programming
In this subsection our goal is to show that when a problem of the form (P ) has
a dynamic programming formulation, then its congruency constrained version
(PL,p,v,k) has a dynamic programming formulation that is only a O(p
3) factor
larger than the formulation for the original problem. This will prove Theorem 3.
We begin with a handy lemma for constructing dynamic programming for-
mulations of combinatorial optimization problems. See Appendix A.5.
Lemma 8. If (H, g, c) is a dynamic programming formulation for (P ) and (H ′, g′, c′)
is a dynamic programming formulation for (DP) with respect to hypergraph H
and costs c then (H ′, g ◦ g′, c′) is a dynamic programming formulation for (P ).
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Consider a directed hypergraph H = (V,E) and an edge (u, S) ∈ E. For v ∈ S
we define the hypergraph obtained from the subdivision of (u, S) with respect to
v to be the hypergraph H ′ = (V ′, E′) where V ′ = V ∪˙{bv} for a new dummy
vertex bv and
E′ = (E\{(u, S)}) ∪ {(u, {v, bv}), (bv, S\{v})}.
That is,H ′ is obtained fromH by replacing edge (u, S) with two edges: (u, {v, bv})
and (bv, S\{v}). We call the edges (u, {v, bv}) and (bv, S\{v}) the subdivision of
edge (u, S).
Lemma 9. Let H = (V,E) be a directed acyclic hypergraph and let H ′ =
(V ′, E′) be the directed acyclic hypergraph obtained via a subdivision of (u, S) ∈ E
with respect to v ∈ S. Then there is an affine function g : RE
′
→ RE, such that
for any affine function c : RE → R, there exists an affine function c′ : RE
′
→ R
such that (H, g, c′) is a dynamic programming formulation of the problem (DP)
on H with objective c.
Moreover if H satisfies the “no common descendants” property, this dynamic
programming formulation is integral.
A proof appears of Lemma 9 appears in Appendix A.6. For a directed hyper-
graph H = (V,E) let ∆(H) := max{|S| : (u, S) ∈ E} and let Γ (H) := |{(u, S) ∈
E : |S| = ∆(H)}|. The following Lemma shows that we may assume the number
of heads of any arc in a dynamic programming formulation is constant. For a
proof see Appendix A.7.
Lemma 10. Consider a combinatorial optimization problem of the form (P ). If
there exists a dynamic programming formulation (H, g, c) for (P ) then there ex-
ists a dynamic programming formulation (H∗, g∗, c∗) for (P ) such that ∆(H∗) ≤
2, and |E(H∗)| =
∑
u∈V (H)
∑
(u,S)∈E(H)(|S| − 1).
Moreover, if H is integral then H∗ is integral.
The next lemma is our main techincal lemma. It provides the backbone of
our dynamic programming formulation for (PL,p,v,k) by showing that we track
the congruency of all hyperpaths rooted at a particular vertex by expanding the
size of our hypergraph by a factor of p∆(H) + 1. For a proof see Appendix A.8
Lemma 11. Let H = (V,E) be a directed acyclic hypergraph. Let p be a prime.
Let k ∈ Zp and let a ∈ ZEp . There exists a directed acyclic hypergraph H
′ =
(V ′, E′) and an affine function g′ : P(H ′)→ P(H), g′(x) = Ax+ b, such that:
1) |E′| ≤ p∆(H)+1|E|
2) For every v ∈ V \L(H), for every k ∈ Zp, if {P ∈ P(Hv) : a(P ) = k
mod p} 6= ∅ then there exists v′ ∈ V (H ′) such that
g′(P(H ′v′)) = {P ∈ P(Hv) : a(P ) = k mod p}.
Moreover if H satisfies the “no common descendants” property then H ′ satisfies
the “no common descendants” property.
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We are now ready to show our main theorem, which says that for any com-
binatorial optimization problem which has a dynamic program, its congruency-
constrained version also has a dynamic program of proportional size. A proof
appears in Appendix A.9.
Theorem 3. Consider an instance of a combinatorial optimization problem (P ).
Let p be a prime, let v ∈ Znp , and let k ∈ Zp. Consider the corresponding
congruency-constrained optimization problem (PL,p,v,k). If (P ) has a dynamic
programming formulation (H, g, c) then (PL,p,v,k) has a dynamic programming
formulation (H ′, g′, c′) such that |E(H ′)| ≤ p3 · |V (H)| · |E(H)|.
Moreover if (H, g, c) is integral then (H ′, g′, c′) is integral.
Due to Theorem 3 and Lemma 7 we have the following Corollary.
Corollary 1. If (P ) has an integral dynamic programming formulation (H, g, c)
then for any v, k, p problem (PL,p,v,k) can be solved in time polynomial in size of
H, the encoding of g, c, v, k, and the prime p.
Via this Corollary, Lemma 3, and Lemma 5 we obtain our first main result:
Theorem 1.
5 Applications
In this section we show a couple of applications of Theorem 1 to computing
the nucleolus of cooperative games. The first application is to Weighted Voting
Games. In [23] a pseudopolynomial time algorithm for computing the nucleolus
of Weighted Voting Games was given. We show how the same result can be
obtained as a special case of Theorem 1. Recall that a weighted voting game
(n, ν) has value function ν : 2[n] → {0, 1} determined by a vector w ∈ Zn and
T ∈ Z, such that for any S ⊆ [n], ν(S) = 1 if and only if w(S) ≥ T .
We partition 2[n] into two classes: N0 := {S ⊆ [n] : w(S) < T } and N1 :=
{S ⊆ [n] : w(S) ≥ T }. If we can design a dynamic programming formulation for
the minimum excess coalition problem restricted to N0: max{−x(S) : w(S) ≤
T−1, S ⊆ [n]} and a dynamic programming formulation for the minimum excess
coalition problem restricted to N1: max{−x(S) + 1 : w(S) ≥ T, S ⊆ [n]}, then
the dynamic programming formulation which takes the maximum of these two
formulations will provide a dynamic programming formulation for the minimum
excess coalition problem of the weighted voting game.
If we let W [k,D] denote max{−x(S) : w(S) ≤ D,S ⊆ [k]} then we can solve
the minimum excess coalition problem restricted to N0 by computingW [n, T−1]
via the following recursive expresssion
W [k,D] =


max{W [k − 1, D − wk],W [k − 1, D]}, if k > 1
−x1, if k = 1 and w1 ≤ D
−∞, if k = 1 and w1 > D.
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It is not hard to construct a dynamic programming formulation (H0, g0, c0) for
the minimum excess coalition problem restricted to N0 by following this recur-
sive expression. The hypergraph H0 will infact be a rooted tree (i.e. all heads
will have size one), and H0 will have O(nT ) vertices and arcs. Via a similar tech-
nique, a dynamic programming formulation (H1, g1, c1) with O(nT ) arcs can be
constructed for the minimum excess problem restricted to N1. Then by tak-
ing the union these dynamic programming formulations, we obtain an integral
dynamic programming formulation of size O(nT ). Therefore by Theorem 1 we
obtain a short proof that
Theorem 4. ( [23] [11]) The nucleolus of a weighted voting game can be com-
puted in pseudopolynomial time.
In the following subsections we will see how the added power of hyperarcs
lets us solve the more complex problem of computing the nucleolus of b-matching
games on graphs of bounded treewidth.
5.1 Treewidth
Consider a graph G = (V,E). We call a pair (T,B) a tree decomposition [14] [26]
of G if T = (VT , ET ) is a tree and B = {Bi ⊆ V : i ∈ VT } is a collection of
subsets of V , called bags, such that
1.
⋃
i∈VT
Bi = V , i.e. every vertex is in some bag,
2. for each v ∈ V , the subgraph of T induced by {i ∈ VT : v ∈ Bi} is a tree,
and
3. for each uv ∈ E, there exists i ∈ VT such that u, v ∈ Bi.
The width of a tree decomposition is the size of the largest bag minus one, i.e.
maxi∈VT {|Bi|−1}. The treewidth of graph G, denoted tw(G), is minimum width
of a tree decomposition of G.
We may assume that tree decompositions of a graph have a special structure.
We say a tree decompostion (T,B) of G is nice if there exists a vertex r ∈ VT
such that if we view T as a tree rooted at r then every vertex i ∈ VT is one of
the following types:
– Leaf: i has no children and |Bi| = 1.
– Introduce: i has one child j and Bi = Bj∪˙{v} for some vertex v ∈ V .
– Forget: i has one child j and Bi∪˙{v} = Bj for some vertex v ∈ V .
– Join: i has two children j1, j2 with Bi = Bj1 = Bj2 .
It turns out that if a graph has a tree decomposition of width w then a nice
tree decomposition of width w times the number of vertices of the graph can be
computed in time polynomial in w and the number of vertices of the graph.
Theorem 5. [18] If G = (V,E) has a tree decompostion of width w with n tree
vertices then there exists a nice tree decomposition of G of width w and O(w|V |)
tree vertices which can be computed in O(w2|V |) time.
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5.2 Dynamic Program for b-Matching Games
We want to show that on graphs of bounded treewidth, the nucleolus of b-
matching games can be computed efficiently. Fix a graph G = (V,E), a vector
of b-values b ∈ ZV , and tree decomposition (T,B) of treewidth w to be used
throughout this section. For i ∈ V (T ) let Ti denote the subtree of T rooted at i,
and also let Gi := G[
⋃
j∈V (Ti)
Bj ]. For any v ∈ V (Gi), let δi(v) := {uv ∈ E(Gi)}.
For any i ∈ V (T ), X ⊆ Bi, d ∈ {d ∈ ZBi : 0 ≤ d ≤ ∆(G)}, and F ⊆ E(Bi),
we define the combinatorial optimization problem C[i,X,d,F] to be the problem
of find a b-matching M and a set of vertice S such that M uses only edges
of Gi, S uses only vertices of Gi, the intersection of M and E(Bi) is F , the
number of edges in M adjacent to u is du for each u in Bi, and the vertices in
S not intersecting an edge in F is X . We define C[i] to be the union over all
C[i,X, d, F ]. A formal definition of C[i,X,d,F] and C[i] is given in Appendix B.
We will show a dynamic programming formulation (H, g, c) for C[i]. Since the
feasible region of the minimum excess coalition problem for b-matching games
is the image of the feasible region of C[i] under the linear map which projects
out M , and ν(S) − x(S) = max(M,S)feasible for C[i] w(M) − x(S), the existence
of (H, g, c) will imply the existence a dynamic programming formulation of the
minimum excess coalition problem for b-matching games of the same encoding
length.
Lemma 12. Let i ∈ V (T ). There exists an integral dynamic programming for-
mulation (H, g, c) for C[i] such that
1) |E(H)| ≤ |V (Ti)| · w ·∆(G)w · w2 and
2) For every j ∈ V (Ti), X ⊆ Bi, d ∈ ZBi , and F ⊆ E(Bi), if C[i,X,d,F]) has a
feasible solution then there exists a ∈ V (H) such that (Ha, g, c) is an integral
dynamic programming formulation for C[i,X,d,F]
The proof of Lemma 12 appears in Appendix A.10. By the preceding discussion,
Lemma 12, and Theorem 1 we have shown Theorem 2.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We have given a formalization of dynamic programming, and shown that in this
formal model adding congruency constraints only increases the complexity by a
polynomial factor of the prime modulus. From this, we showed that whenever
the minimum excess coalition problem of a cooperative game can be solved via
dynamic programming, its nucleolus can be computed in time polynomial in
the size of the dynamic program. Using this result we gave an algorithm for
computing the nucleolus of b-matching games on graphs of bounded treewidth.
In [15] they show that a generalization of the dynamic programming model
in [7] called Branched Polyhedral Systems also has an integral extended formu-
lation. It is natural to wonder how our framework could extend to Branched
Polyhedral Systems and if that would enable to computation of the nucleolus
for any interesting classes of cooperative games.
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Appendix
A Omitted Proofs
A.1 Of Lemma 2
Proof. We begin by considering the Two Disjoint Directed Paths (TDDP) prob-
lem. This well-known NP-complete problem gives as input a directed graph G
with two source nodes s1, s2 and two sink nodes t1, t2, and the problem is to
decide if there exists a pair of arc disjoint paths, one from s1 to t1 and the other
from s2 to t2.
Add an arc (s1, t2) if it does not already exist. Call the new graphG
′. Observe
that there are arc disjoint s1− t1 and s2− t2 paths in G if and only if there is an
s1−t2 path in G′ using the arc (s2, t1) in G′. Let X be the set of incidence vectors
of s1 − t2 paths in G
′. The graph G′ with s1, s2, t1, t2 labelled may serve as a
compact presentation of X . Let c ∈ RE(G
′) be the all-ones vector. Furthermore,
the corresponding problem (P ) can be solved in polynomial time with respect
to the encoding size of G′ and c.
Suppose we have an oracle which can solve the corresponding instance of (PL)
in polynomial time for any linear subspace L ⊆ RE(G
′). Consider the particular
linear subspace
L := {x ∈ RE(G
′) : x(t1,s2) = 0}.
Observe that there an s1 − t2 path in G′ using arc t1 − s2 if and only if X\L is
nonempty. Using our oracle for (PL) we can decide in polynomial time if this is
the case. 
A.2 Of Lemma 4
Proof. ( [23]) Let A be the n×k matrix whose ith column is vector vi. If v1, . . . , vk
are linearly independent over Fp then there exists a k×k submatrix B of A such
that det(B) 6= 0 (over Fp). Then det(B) 6= 0 over R and hence v1, . . . , vk are
linearly independent over R.
Now suppose that v1, . . . , vk are linearly dependent over Fp for all p ∈ P . If
k > n then clearly v1, . . . , vk are linearly dependent over R and we are done.
So suppose that k ≤ n. Let B be a k × k submatrix of A. We will show that
det(B) = 0.
For each p ∈ P , p divides det(B) since v1, . . . , vk are linearly dependent over
Fp. Note that det(B) is an integer since it is the determinant of a 0-1 matrix.
Since each p ∈ P is prime, this implies that∏
p∈P
p | det(B),
and hence, if det(B) 6= 0 then ∏
p∈P
p ≤ det(B).
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But in this case,
2log2(n!) <
∏
p∈P
p ≤ det(B) ≤ n!,
with the last inequality following since B is a 0-1 matrix, yielding a contradiction.
Therefore det(B) = 0 as desired.
Now generate a set P of primes such that |P | ≥ log2(n!). By the Prime
Number Theorem, we can simply find the first log2(n!) primes in O(n
3) time
and thus we can construct P in time polynomial in n. Furthermore, the value of
each prime in P will be polynomial in n (i.e. each prime in P can be encoded
with O(log(n)) bits). 
A.3 Of Lemma 5
Proof. For a linear subspace L ⊆ Rn, we say that x 6∈ span(L) over Fp if there
does not exist a basis B of L such that B ∪ {x} is linearly dependent over the
field Fp. By Lemma 4 we can solve (PL) by solving,
max{f(x) : x ∈ X , x 6∈ span(L) over Fp for some p ∈ P}
The above problem can be solved by solving for each p ∈ P ,
max{f(x) : x ∈ X , x 6∈ span(L) over Fp} (PL,p)
and taking the solution of maximum objective value found. Let Bp be a basis
of L⊥ over Fp. Assuming L is presented to us through a fixed basis, we can
compute Bp in polynomial time via Gaussian Elimination [10]. Now, x is not
in the span of L over Fp if and only if there exists v ∈ Bp such that vTx 6= 0
mod p. Hence we can solve (PL,p) by solving for each v ∈ Bp,
max{f(x) : x ∈ X , vTx 6= 0 mod p} (PL,p,v)
and taking the solution of maximum value found. Now vTx 6= 0 mod p if and
only if there exists k ∈ [p− 1] such that vTx = k (over Fp). Thus we can solve
(PL,p,v) by solving for each k ∈ [p − 1], (PL,p,v,k) and taking the solution of
maximum value found.
Hence by solving O(|P |(n − dim(L))maxp∈P p) = O(n3maxp∈P p) = O(n6)
congruency-constrained optimization problems of the form (PL,p,v,k) we can solve
(PL). 
A.4 Of Lemma 6
Proof. First suppose that H does not satisfy the no common descendants con-
dition. Then there exists (ℓ, J) ∈ E such that there exist u, v ∈ J and w ∈ V
such w is a descendant of u and of v. Suppose for a contradiction that H has a
reference subset system with ground set I.
Nucleolus Dynamic Programming 19
We claim that Iw ⊆ Iv. The proof of this claim will symmetrically show that
Iw ⊆ Iu. Then Iw ∩ Iv ⊃ Iw 6= ∅ violating the second property of a reference
subsset system.
To prove the claim we will prove something stronger. In particular we will
show that for any x, y ∈ V such that y is a descendant of x, we have that Iy ⊆ Ix.
Suppose not. Choose a counterexample x, y with path P starting at x and ending
at y so that the number of edges in P is minimal. Clearly |E(P )| 6= 0 as otherwise
x = y. Now, from the definition of P there exists an arc (x, J) ∈ E(P ) and there
exists z ∈ J such that there is a subgraph of P , denoted P ′, such that P ′ is a
path starting at z and ending at y. By minimality, Iy ⊆ Iz . By the first property
of reference subset systems, Iz ⊆ Ix. Thus Iy ⊆ Ix contradicting that x, y and
P form a counterexample.
Now for the other direction of the equivalence suppose that H satisfies the
no common descendants condition. We will construct a reference subset system
for H as follows. Let I = V and for each v ∈ V let Iv be the set of descendants
of v. Then I satisfies the first property of a reference subset system since the
descendant relation is transitive. Further, the no common descendants condition
implies that I satisfies the second property of a reference subset system. Lastly,
no Iv is empty since every vertex is their own descendant. 
A.5 Of Lemma 8
Proof. The function g◦g′ is map between P(H ′) and X , and moreover it is affine
since both g and g′ are affine. Furthermore,
g ◦ g′(P(H ′)) = g(P(H)) = X .
Finally, for any P ∈ P(H ′),
f(g ◦ g′(P )) = c(g′(P )) = c′(P ).

A.6 Of Lemma 9
Proof. Take g to be the affine function defined as follows. For any e ∈ E and
x ∈ RE
′
,
g(x)e :=
{
x(u,{v,bv}), if e = (u, S)
xe, otherwise.
It is not hard to see that g is affine, and in fact linear. In fact, g is simply the
function which identifies e with (u, {v, bv}) and every other edge in e with the
corresponding edge in E′.
To see that g is a bijection between P(H) and P(H ′) it suffices to observe
that a path P in P(H ′) uses (u, {v, bv}) if and only P uses (bv, S\{v}). This
follows immediately from the definition of hyperpaths.
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Now for any c : RE → R let c′ : RE
′
→ R be the unique affine function which
acts on the standard basis in the following way: for any e ∈ E′,
c′(e) =


c((u, S)), if e = (u, {v, bv})
0, if e = (bv, S\{v})
c(e), otherwise.
Again since a path P in P(H ′) uses (u, {v, bv}) if and only P uses (bv, S\{v}),
it is easy to see that c(g(P ) = c′(P ) for any P ∈ P(H ′). Hence (H ′, g, c′) is the
desired dynamic programming formulation.
Since the subdivision operation preserves the “no common descendants”
property, (H ′, g, c) is integral if H satisfies the no common descendants con-
dition. 
A.7 Of Lemma 10
Proof. We proceed by double induction on ∆(H) and Γ (H). In the base case,
for any Γ (H) if ∆(H) ≤ 2 then (H, g, c) is the desired dynamic program. In the
inductive case consider H such that ∆(H) > 2 and suppose the lemma holds on
all directed acyclic hypergraphs H ′ with ∆(H ′) < ∆(H) or ∆(H ′) = ∆(H) and
Γ (H ′) < Γ (H). Since ∆(H) ≥ 3 there exists an edge (u, S) ∈ E(H) such that
|S| ≥ 3. Let (H ′, g′, c′) be the dynamic program for (DP) on H with objective c
given by Lemma 9 whereH ′ is obtained by a subdivision of (u, S) with respect to
vertex v ∈ S. By Lemma 8 (H ′, g ◦ g′, c′) is a dynamic programming formulation
for (P ).
Now notice that either ∆(H ′) = ∆(H) − 1 or ∆(H ′) = ∆(H) and Γ (H ′) =
Γ (H) − 1. Hence by induction there is a dynamic program (H∗, g∗, c∗) for the
problem (DP) on hypergraph H ′ with respect to objective c′ such that ∆(H∗) ≤
2 and
|E(H∗)| =
∑
u′∈V (H′)
∑
(u′,S′)∈E(H′)
(|S′| − 1)
= |S\{v}| − 1 + |{v, bv}| − 1 +
∑
u′∈V (H)
∑
(u′,S′)∈E(H)\{(u,S)}
|S′| − 1
=
∑
u′∈V (H)
∑
(u′,S′)∈E(H)
|S′| − 1,
where the second equality follows since H ′ is obtained from H via a subdivi-
sion of (u, S) with respect to v. By Lemma 8 (H∗, g ◦ g′ ◦ g∗, c∗) is a dynamic
programming formulation for (P ) as desired.
Since subdivision preserves the “no common descendants” property, if H is
integral then H∗ is integral. 
A.8 Of Lemma 11
Proof. We may assume that each source u of H has at most one arc outgoing
from u. To see this, if the arcs leaving u are (u, S1), . . . , (u, Sℓ) then we can
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replace u with ℓ vertices u1, . . . , uℓ and replace the arcs of u with (u1, Sl),. . . ,
(uℓ, Sℓ). This does not increase the number of arcs, and preserves the structure
of the paths in P(H).
Now suppose for a contradiction that the lemma is false. Consider a coun-
terexample H = (V,E) which minimizes |E|. Then E 6= ∅, otherwise H is triv-
ially not a counterexample. Let u ∈ V be a source of H which has an outgoing
arc, let (u, S) ∈ E be the arc outgoing from u and let d = |S|. Arbitrarily fix an
indexing on the vertices of S as in S = {s1, . . . , sd}.
Since H −u has fewer arcs than H , it is not a counterexample to the lemma.
Hence there exists a directed acyclic hypergraph H and an affine function g
satisfying properties 1) and 2) of the lemma with respect to H − u.
We now construct a new directed acylic hypergraph H ′ and affine function
g′ : RE
′
→ RE via the following procedure.
1. Initialize H ′ = (V ′, E′) to be the hypergraph H¯.
2. For every k ∈ Zp such that {P ∈ P(H) : a(P ) = k mod p} 6= ∅ do:
(a) Add a new vertex uk to V ′.
(b) For each q ∈ Zdp such that a
T q = k − g((u, S)) mod p do:
– if for every i ∈ [d] there exists s′i ∈ V
′ such that g is a bijection
between P(H ′
s′
i
) and {P ∈ P(Hsi) : a(P ) = k − g((u, S)) mod p}
then add arc (uk,
⋃
i∈[d] s
′
i) to E
′.
3. We will define g′ by its action on the standard basis. For each e ∈ E′ we
define
g′(e) :=
{
χ((u, S)), if e is outgoing from uk for some k ∈ Zp
g(e), otherwise.
We will first verify that property 1) is satisfied by H ′. Since H satisfies property
1), |E(H)| ≤ p∆(H−v)+1(|E| − 1). By our construction of H ′, E′ has at most
p · |Zdp | more arcs than E(H), and hence
|E′| ≤ |E|+ p · |Zdp | ≤ p
∆(H−v)+1(|E| − 1) + pd+1 ≤ p∆(H)+1|E|.
Now we will show that property 2) is satisfied by H ′ and g′. Let v ∈ V \L(H).
Let k ∈ Zp and suppose that {P ∈ P(Hv) : a(P ) = k mod p} 6= ∅. If v 6= u,
then since H and g satisfies property 2), H ′ and g′ satisfy property 2) by steps
1. and 3. of the construction. Thus we may assume that v = u. Then the vertex
uk was added to V ′ in step 2a) of the construction. It suffices to show that g′ is
a bijection between P(H ′
uk
) and {P ∈ P(Hu) : a(P ) = k mod p}.
First we show surjectivity. Let P ∈ {P ∈ P(Hu) : a(P ) = k mod p}. Then P
is the disjoint union of (u, S) and d paths P1, . . . , Pd where each Pi is in P(Hsi)
respectively. For each i ∈ [d], let ki = a(Pi) mod p. By property 2) applied to H
and g, and by our construction of H ′ starting from H and g′ starting from g, for
each i ∈ [d] there exists a vertex s′i ∈ V
′ ∩ V such that g′ is a bijection between
P(H ′s′
i
) and {P ∈ P(Hsi) : a(P ) = ki mod p}. Since g
′ is such a bijection there
exists P ′i ∈ P(H
′
s′
i
) such that g′(P ′i ) = Pi.
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By step 2b) of our construction, there is an arc of the form (uk,
⋃
i∈[d] s
′
i) in
E′. Hence there is a path P ′ ∈ P(H ′
uk
) which is a disjoint union of (uk,
⋃
i∈[d] s
′
i)
with P ′1, . . . , P
′
d. But then
g′(P ′) = g′(ul,
⋃
i∈[d]
s′i)
⋃
i∈[d]
g′(P ′d) = (u, S)
⋃
i∈[d]
Pi = P.
Now we show injectivity. Let P ′, Q′ ∈ P(H ′
uk
) be paths in H ′ such that
g′(P ′) = g′(Q′). Let P = g′(P ′) = g′(Q′). We consider the disjoint union of
hyperpaths obtained by deleting uk (and hence the single arc outgoing from uk)
from P ′ and Q′. Observe that
P − u = g′(P ′ − u) = g′(Q′ − u).
By the bijectivity of g′ inherited from g, this implies that P ′ − u = Q′ − u. But
that necessarily implies that P ′ and Q′ have the same arc outgoing from uk.
Thus P ′ = Q′. Therefore we have shown property 2).
It is easy to see that the construction preserves the no common descendants
property. 
A.9 Of Theorem 3
Proof. We first apply Lemma 10 to problem (P ) and dynamic programming
formulation (H, g, c) to obtain a dynamic programming formulation (H∗, g∗, c∗)
for (P ) such that
∆(H∗) ≤ 2 and |E(H∗)| ≤ |V (H)| · |E(H)|.
Since g∗ is an affine function, there exists a matrix A and a vector b such that
g∗(x) = Ax + b for any x. Now apply Lemma 11 to hypergraph H∗ with prime
p, integer k − vT b ∈ Zp, and vector AT v ∈ ZEp . We obtain a directed acyclic
hypergraph H ′ and affine function g′ : P(H ′)→ P(H∗) such that
1) |E′| ≤ p∆(H
∗)+1|E(H∗)| ≤ p3|V (H)||E(H)| and
2) For every v ∈ V (H∗)\L(H∗), if
{P ∈ P(H∗v ) : v
TAχ(P ) = k − vT b mod p} 6= ∅
then there exists v′ ∈ V (H ′) such that g′ is a bijection between P(H ′v′) and
{P ∈ P(H∗v ) : v
TAχ(P ) = k − vT b mod p}.
Let c′ : RE(H
′) → R be the affine function c∗ ◦ g′. Let T be the set of sources in
H ′ that satisfy the hypothesis in property 2). We claim that
D := (
⋃
u∈T
H ′u, g
∗ ◦ g′, c′)
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is a dynamic programming formulation for (P ). Indeed by property 2),
g′(P(
⋃
u∈T
H ′u)) = {P ∈: P(H
∗) : vTA(P ) = k − vT b mod p}.
Now observe that
{P ∈: P(H∗) : vTA(P ) = k − vT b mod p}
= {P ∈: P(H∗) : vT (A(P ) + b) = k mod p}
= {P ∈: P(H∗) : vT g∗(P ) = k mod p}.
Since g∗(P(H∗)) = X , we have that
g∗({P ∈: P(H∗) : vT g∗(P ) = k mod p}) = {x ∈ X : vTx = k mod p}.
Therefore
g∗ ◦ g′(P(
⋃
u∈T
H ′u)) = {x ∈ X : v
Tx = k mod p},
the feasible region of (PL,p,v,k).
Lastly for any P ∈ P(
⋃
u∈T H
′
u), we have
f(g∗ ◦ g′(P )) = c(g′(P )) = c′(P ).
Thus D is a dynamic programming formulation for (PL,p,v,k). Observe that the
lemmas applied in the construction ofD all preserve integrality. Hence if (H, g, c)
is integral then D is integral. 
A.10 Of Lemma 12
Proof. We proceed by induction on the distance from i to a leaf of T . If i is a
leaf of T the Lemma is trivial. So we suppose that i is not a leaf of T and the
Lemma holds for all vertices j of T which are closer to a leaf than i.
Now we proceed by case distinction on which class of node i is: an Introduce
node, a Forget node, or a Join node.
Case: Introduce. If i is an Introduce node then i has one child j, and Bi =
Bj∪˙{v} for some vertex v ∈ V . Let (H ′, g′, c′) be the dynamic programming
formulation for C[j] guaranteed by the inductive hypothesis. We construct a
new dynamic programming formulation (H, g, c) via the following procedure:
1. Initialize H to H ′.
2. For each e′ ∈ E(H ′), define the action of g on e′ to be g(e′) = g′(e′).
3. For each e′ ∈ E(H ′), define the action of c on e′ to be c(e′) = c′(e′).
4. For every X ⊆ Bi, d ∈ ZBi , F ⊆ E(Bi) such that C[i,X, d, F ] has a feasible
solution do:
(a) Add a new vertex ai,X,d,F to V (H)
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(b) Let aj,X∩Bj ,d
′,F∩E(Bj) be the vertex of V (H ′) guaranteed by property
2), such that (H
a
j,X∩Bj,d
′,F∩E(Bj ) , g, c) is a dynamic programming formu-
lation for C[j,X ∩Bj , d′, F ∩E(Bj)], where d′u := du −
{
1, if uv ∈ F
0, otherwise.
for all u ∈ Bj .
(c) Add arc e = (ai,X,d,F , {aj,X∩Bj ,d
′,F∩E(Bj)}) to E(H).
(d) Define action of g on e to be
g(e) =
(
F\E(Bj)
(X\Bj) ∪ ({v} ∩ V (F ))
)
∈ {0, 1}E(Gi),V (Gi)
(e) Define action of c on e to be
c(e) = w(F\E(Bj))− x(X\Bj)− x({v} ∩ V (F )).
Property 1) is immediate from induction and the number of arcs added by the
construction.
To verify property 2) consider C[i′, X, d, F ] satisfying the hypothesis of prop-
erty 2). If i′ 6= i property 2) holds immediately by induction. So suppose
i′ = i. We claim that (Hai,X,d,F , g, c) is a dynamic programming formulation
for C[i,X, d, F ].
Let
(
M S
)T
be a feasible solution to C[i,X, d, F ]. For any
(
M S
)T
feasible
for C[i,X, d, F ] there exists
(
M ′ S′
)T
feasible for C[j,X ∩ Bj , d′, F ∩ E(Bj)]
(where d′ is as defined in Step 2b) of the construction) such that
M =M ′∪˙ (F ∩ E(Bj)) and S = S
′∪˙ (X\Bj) ∪ ({v}) ∩ V (F ))) .
Moreover, for any
(
M ′ S′
)T
feasible for C[j,X ∩Bj , d′, F ∩ E(Bj)],(
M ′∪˙ (F ∩E(Bj))
S′∪˙ (X\Bj) ∪ ({v} ∩ V (F ))
)
is feasible for C[i,X, d, F ]. Hence by Step 2d) and Step 2e) of the construction,
and the inductive hypothesis, g and c behave as desired for the dynamic program
(Hai,X,d,F , g, c) to be a dynamic programming formulation of C[i,X, d, F ].
Case: Forget. If i is a Forget node then i has one child j, and Bi∪˙{v} = Bj
for some vertex v ∈ V . Let (H ′, g′, c′) be the dynamic programming formulation
for C[j] guaranteed by the inductive hypothesis. We construct a new dynamic
programming formulation (H, g, c) via the following procedure:
1. Initialize H to H ′.
2. For each e′ ∈ E(H ′), define the action of g on e′ to be g(e′) = g′(e′).
3. For each e′ ∈ E(H ′), define the action of c on e′ to be c(e′) = c′(e′).
4. For every X ⊆ Bi, d ∈ ZBi , F ⊆ E(Bi) such that C[i,X, d, F ] has a feasible
solution do:
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(a) Add a new vertex ai,X,d,F to V (H).
(b) For each J ⊆ δ(v) ∩ E(Bj), d′ ∈ ZBj such that d′u = du for all u ∈ Bi,
and for each Y ∈ {X,X∪{v}}, if C[j, Y, d′, F ∪J ] has a feasible solution
do:
i. Let aj,Y,d
′,F∪J be the vertex of V (H ′) guaranteed by property 2),
such that (Haj,Y,d′,F∪J , g, c) is a dynamic programming formulation
for C[j, Y, d′, F ∪ J ].
ii. Add arc e = (ai,X,d,F , {aj,Y,d
′,F∪J}) to E(H).
iii. Define action of g on e to be g(e) = 0.
iv. Define action of c on e to be c(e) = −w(J) + x(Y ∩ {v}).
Property 1) is immediate from induction and the number of arcs added by the
construction.
To verify property 2) consider C[i′, X, d, F ] satisfying the hypothesis of prop-
erty 2). If i′ 6= i property 2) holds immediately by induction. So suppose
i′ = i. We claim that (Hai,X,d,F , g, c) is a dynamic programming formulation
for C[i,X, d, F ].
Let
(
M S
)T
be feasible for C[i,X, d, F ]. Then there exists(
M ′
S′
)
∈ {0, 1}E(Gj),V (Gj)
such that M ′ = M ∪˙J for some J ∈ δ(v) ∩ E(Bj) and S′ = S ∪ Y for some
Y ∈ {X,X ∪ {v}}. Further there exists d′ ∈ ZBj such that |M ′ ∩ δ(u)| = d′u
for all u ∈ Bj . Hence (M
′, S′) is feasible for C[j, Y, d′, F ∪ J ]. Moreover for any(
M ′ S′
)T
feasible for C[j, Y, d′, F ∪ J ],(
M ′\J
(S ∪X)\Y
)
is feasible for C[i,X, d, F ]. Thus by induction and Step 2b) of the construction,
g and c behave as desired for (Hai,X,d,F , g, c) to be a dynamic programming
formulation of C[i,X, d, F ].
Case: Join. If i is a Join node then i has two children: j1 and j2, and Bj1 =
Bj2 = Bi. Let (H
1, g1, c1) be the dynamic programming formulation for C[j1]
guaranteed by the induction hypothesis, and let (H2, g2, c2) be the similarly
guaranteed dynamic programming formulation for C[j2] We construct a new
dynamic programming formulation (H, g, c) via the following procedure:
1. Initialize H = H1∪˙H2.
2. For each e′ ∈ E(H1), define the action of g on e′ to be g(e′) = g1(e′).
Similarly for each e′ ∈ E(H2), define the action of g on e′ to be g(e′) = g2(e′).
3. For each e′ ∈ E(H1), define the action of c on e′ to be c(e′) = c1(e′). Similarly
for each e′ ∈ E(H2), define the action of c on e′ to be c(e′) = c2(e′).
4. For every X ⊆ Bi, d ∈ ZBi , F ⊆ E(Bi) such that C[i,X, d, F ] has a feasible
do:
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(a) Add a new vertex ai,X,d,F to V (H).
(b) For every d1 ∈ ZBj1 such that C[j1, X, d1, F ] has a feasible solution, and
for every d2 ∈ ZBj2 such that C[j2, X, d2, F ] has a feasible solution, if
d1 + d2 − |F ∩ δ(u)| = du for all u ∈ Bi then do:
i. Let aj1,X,d
1,F be the vertex of V (H1) guaranteed by property 2),
such that (H
aj1,X,d
1,F , g, c) is a dynamic programming formulation
for C[j1, X, d
1, F ].
ii. Let aj2,X,d
2,F be the vertex of V (H2) guaranteed by property 2),
such that (H
aj2,X,d
2,F , g, c) is a dynamic programming formulation
for C[j2, X, d
2, F ].
iii. Add arc e = (ai,X,d,F , {aj1,X,d
1,F , aj2,X,d
2,F }) to E(H).
iv. Define action of g on e to be g(e) = 0.
v. Define action of c on e to be
c(e) = −w(F ) + x({u ∈ Bi : d
1
u > 0 and d
2
u > 0}).
Property 1) is immediate from induction and the number of arcs added by the
construction.
To verify property 2) consider C[i′, X, d, F ] satisfying the hypothesis of prop-
erty 2). If i′ 6= i property 2) holds immediately by induction. So suppose
i′ = i. We claim that (Hai,X,d,F , g, c) is a dynamic programming formulation
for C[i,X, d, F ].
Let
(
M S
)T
be feasible for C[i,X, d, F ]. Then there exists
(
M1 S1
)T
feasible
for C[j1, X, d
1, F ] and
(
M2 S2
)T
feasible for C[j2, X, d
2, F ] such that
d1 + d2 − |F ∩ δ(u)| = du
for all u ∈ Bi, satisfying that
M =M1 ∪M2 and S = S1 ∪ S2.
Moreover for any
(
M1 S1
)T
feasible for C[j1, X, d
1, F ] and for any
(
M2 S2
)T
feasible for C[j2, X, d
2, F ] such that d1 + d2 − |F ∩ δ(u)| = du for all u ∈ Bi,(
M1 ∪M2
S1 ∪ S2
)
is feasible for C[i,X, d, F ]. Hence g(P(Hai,X,d,F )) is equal to the feasible region
C[i,X, d, F ] by Steps 2b)ii− 2b)iv of the construction. Furthermore
w(M)− x(S) = w(M1) + w(M2)− w(M1 ∩M2)− x(S1)− x(S2) + x(S1 ∩ S2)
= w(M1)− x(S1) + w(M2)− x(S2)− w(F )
+ x({u ∈ Bi : d
1
u > 0 and d
2
u > 0})
with the second equality following since there are no edges from a vertex in
V (Gj1 )\Bi to a vertex in V (Gj2 )\Bi by the properties of tree decompositions.
Hence c behaves as desired for (Hai,X,d,F ] , g, c) to be a dynamic programming
formulation of C[i,X, d, F ].
It is not hard to see that the constructions in each case preserve integrality.

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B Omitted Formulations
The formal definitions of some problem formulations take up a lot of space in
the main body. We add them here for the interested reader.
max w(M) − x(S) (C[i,X,d,F])
s.t. |M ∩ δi(v)| ≤ bv ∀v ∈ V
|M ∩ δi(u)| ≤ du ∀u ∈ Bi
du = 0 ∀u ∈ X
M ∩ E(Bi) = F
S = V (M)∪˙X
X ⊆ Bi
M ⊆ E(Gi).
max w(M)− x(S) (C[i])
s.t. (M,S) is feasible for C[i,X, d, F ]
for some (X, d, F ) ∈ Bi × Z
Bi × E(Gi).
